

## THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF WEAPONISING HUNGER AND POVERTY IN NIGERIA, 2015–2023

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### Abstract

Food insecurity and poverty remain among the most consequential socio-economic challenges confronting Nigeria despite the country's vast natural and agricultural endowments. Between 2015 and 2023, a convergence of economic recession, escalating insecurity, persistent governance failures, and the global disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically intensified hunger and deprivation across the country. This article examines the concept of the weaponisation of hunger and poverty- understood as the deliberate or structural use of deprivation as a mechanism of political control, social manipulation, and security destabilisation and analyses its implications for national security in Nigeria. Employing Social Contract Theory as its analytical framework, the study argues that when the Nigerian state fails to guarantee citizens' basic welfare, particularly access to food and economic security, it erodes its own legitimacy and creates structural conditions conducive to violent extremism, insurgent recruitment, and social unrest. Drawing on qualitative historical analysis and secondary sources including government reports, international development data, and scholarly literature, the paper examines the structural causes of food insecurity, the relationship between poverty and political patronage, and the nexus between hunger and armed conflict. The study finds that while hunger in Nigeria is rarely the product of explicit state policy, elite mismanagement, systemic corruption, and institutional neglect have effectively transformed poverty into a durable mechanism for reinforcing political dependency and social inequality. The article concludes that hunger and poverty have become critical national security concerns demanding comprehensive reforms in agricultural policy, governance accountability, social protection, and rural security.

**Keywords:** *food insecurity, poverty, national security, weaponisation, social contract, governance, Nigeria*

## **Introduction**

Food insecurity and poverty are among the most pressing socio-economic challenges confronting Nigeria in the twenty-first century. These conditions undermine individuals' psychological freedom and material capacity to meet the necessities of survival, and, when widespread and persistent, weaken a nation's political, economic, and social foundations. The paradox at the heart of Nigeria's food crisis is stark: the country possesses extensive arable land, favourable climatic conditions across its ecological zones, and a large agricultural labour force - yet food insecurity remains entrenched. According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation, more than 31 million Nigerians faced acute food insecurity in 2022, with projections suggesting that figure could rise significantly absent decisive policy intervention.<sup>1</sup>

The period between 2015 and 2023 was particularly consequential. Nigeria experienced a severe economic recession in 2016, driven by the collapse of global oil prices and structural weaknesses in the non-oil economy. The recession pushed millions into poverty and accelerated food price inflation, disproportionately affecting rural households and urban informal workers. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020–2021 compounded these vulnerabilities by disrupting agricultural supply chains, eliminating informal employment, and contracting remittance flows. By 2023, Nigeria had surpassed India to become the country with the largest number of people living in extreme poverty globally.<sup>2</sup>

These developments have prompted scholars and policy analysts to engage seriously with the concept of the “weaponisation of hunger and poverty” - a framework that interrogates whether

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<sup>1</sup>Food and Agriculture Organisation, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023* (Rome: FAO, 2023), 14.

<sup>2</sup>World Bank, *Poverty and Inequality Platform: Nigeria Data* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2023), 3.

deprivation is deliberately sustained or structurally reproduced in ways that serve identifiable political or strategic interests. In contexts where citizens are economically vulnerable, poverty can suppress political resistance, generate dependence on state patronage networks, and facilitate the recruitment of desperate individuals into armed groups and criminal organisations.<sup>3</sup>

This article examines the security implications of this relationship, seeking to understand whether the persistence of food insecurity in Nigeria between 2015 and 2023 represents a deliberate strategy of political manipulation, a consequence of systemic governance failure, or - most likely - a structural condition that different political actors have exploited for varied purposes.

### **Theoretical Framework: Social Contract Theory**

This study adopts Social Contract Theory as its principal analytical framework. Originating in the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the theory posits that the legitimacy of political authority derives from an implicit agreement between citizens and the state. In exchange for surrendering certain natural freedoms, citizens receive from the state protection, security, and the provision of public goods necessary for survival and well-being. When governments fail to fulfil these responsibilities, the social contract between the state and its citizens is breached.<sup>4</sup>

In the Nigerian context, widespread hunger and poverty constitute precisely such a breach. When citizens are denied access to essential resources through governance failures - whether through corruption, mismanagement, or deliberate political neglect - trust in state institutions erodes. Hobbes's foundational insight that the primary obligation of the sovereign is to protect

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<sup>3</sup>Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), 4–6.

<sup>4</sup>Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Maurice Cranston (London: Penguin, 1968), 49–52; John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 285–290.

subjects from conditions of insecurity and want remains profoundly relevant to Nigeria's predicament.<sup>5</sup>

The weaponisation of hunger and poverty can be interpreted through the Social Contract lens in a particularly instructive way. If political elites allow structural deprivation to persist - whether through explicit manipulation or institutionalised neglect - they simultaneously undermine the moral authority of the state and generate a population whose political behaviour is conditioned by desperation rather than civic deliberation. In this sense, hunger and poverty do not simply reflect a failure of governance: they can become embedded within governance as mechanisms of social control.

### **Literature Review**

The scholarly literature on the relationship between food insecurity, poverty, and political stability is extensive and multidisciplinary. Amartya Sen's landmark analysis demonstrated that hunger is rarely the product of absolute food scarcity; it is typically the result of failures in the distribution of entitlements and political will. Sen's argument that famines do not occur in functioning democracies with a free press has been influential in directing attention toward governance and political accountability as the primary determinants of food security outcomes.<sup>6</sup>

Alex de Waal's subsequent work on famine crimes deepened this analysis, documenting how political actors in African conflict zones have exploited food scarcity as a weapon of war and a tool of civilian control.<sup>7</sup> Claude Ake argued that African post-colonial states have systematically prioritised elite accumulation over broad-based development, producing political economies in

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<sup>5</sup>Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 117–120.

<sup>6</sup>Amartya Sen, *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 1–10.

<sup>7</sup>de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 4.

which poverty and inequality are structurally reproduced rather than accidentally maintained.<sup>8</sup>

Robert Bates demonstrated that agricultural policy in many African states has been deliberately skewed against smallholder farmers in favour of urban and elite constituencies, creating conditions of chronic rural underdevelopment.<sup>9</sup>

Mahmood Mamdani's analysis of the bifurcated colonial state traces how the institutional legacies of colonial rule have shaped differential citizenship and unequal access to state resources in postcolonial governance.<sup>10</sup> Falola and Heaton provide an essential historical overview of the political and economic factors shaping Nigeria's development trajectory, including the distortions introduced by oil dependence.<sup>11</sup> Thurston's study of Boko Haram offers a detailed account of how socio-economic marginalisation in the Lake Chad Basin created the conditions of grievance and desperation that the insurgency exploited.<sup>12</sup> The International Crisis Group's reporting on farmer–herder conflicts in the Middle Belt similarly documents the nexus between resource competition, governance failure, and violent conflict.<sup>13</sup>

More recent scholarship has turned explicitly to the electoral and patronage dimensions of poverty politics in Nigeria. Research on the 2023 Nigerian presidential election demonstrates that socio-economic indicators, including income levels, education attainment, and regional development indices, significantly influence electoral behaviour and the susceptibility of communities to patronage-based mobilisation.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 11.

<sup>9</sup>Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 7.

<sup>10</sup>Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 18–30.

<sup>11</sup>Toyin Falola and Matthew Heaton, *A History of Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 215.

<sup>12</sup>Alex Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 47.

<sup>13</sup>International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer–Herder Violence* (Brussels: ICG, 2018), 5–8.

<sup>14</sup>Freedom House, *Nigeria Country Report 2023* (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2023), 7.

## **Methodology**

This study adopts a qualitative, historical and analytical methodology to examine the relationship between hunger, poverty, and national security in Nigeria between 2015 and 2023. The primary analytical method is content analysis, applied to a body of secondary sources including peer-reviewed academic articles, government policy documents, international development reports, and civil society publications. Key empirical sources include the National Bureau of Statistics Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index Survey (2022),<sup>15</sup> The World Bank's Poverty and Inequality Platform Nigeria data (2023),<sup>16</sup> The Global Hunger Index (2023),<sup>17</sup> and the Food and Agriculture Organisation's State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (2023).<sup>18</sup>

Historical analysis is employed to contextualise contemporary developments within Nigeria's longer political and economic trajectory, with particular attention to the legacies of colonial institutional design, the distortions introduced by oil dependence, and the dynamics of post-1999 democratic governance. Comparative analysis draws on documented cases from Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and other African states where food resources have been politically manipulated, situating Nigeria's experience within broader continental patterns.

## **Weaponising Hunger and Poverty: Conceptual Clarification**

The term "weaponisation" has military origins, referring to the conversion of a material or substance into an instrument of harm. Applied to social conditions, it describes a process by which structural deprivation is deliberately engineered or structurally reproduced in ways that serve

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<sup>15</sup>National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index Survey 2022 (Abuja: NBS, 2022), 4–6.

<sup>16</sup>World Bank, Poverty and Inequality Platform: Nigeria Data, 3.

<sup>17</sup>Global Hunger Index, 2023 Global Hunger Index: Nigeria (Bonn: Welthungerhilfe, 2023), 2.

identifiable political, military, or social control objectives. Sen's entitlement theory established the foundational premise that hunger is not primarily a problem of food availability but of access, and that access is shaped by political and economic arrangements that can be manipulated by powerful actors.<sup>19</sup>

De Waal extended this insight to document cases in which access to food aid and agricultural resources was deliberately restricted or selectively distributed by belligerents and governing elites to advance political or military objectives.<sup>20</sup> Devereux's typology of famine causation similarly distinguishes between natural, market, and policy-induced famines, identifying the last category as the most politically significant.<sup>21</sup>

In the Nigerian case, the evidence does not support a finding that hunger has been deliberately engineered as an explicit instrument of state policy. Rather, the weaponisation of hunger and poverty operates through structural mechanisms: the institutional neglect of agricultural development, the misappropriation of resources designated for poverty alleviation, the politicisation of humanitarian assistance, and the exploitation of economic vulnerability within electoral patronage systems.

## **Structural Causes of Food Insecurity and Poverty in Nigeria**

### **i. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Political Economy**

Nigeria's food insecurity crisis has deep historical roots. The colonial political economy established extractive institutional patterns that prioritised the transfer of resources to metropolitan centres and the maintenance of elite control over productive assets.<sup>22</sup> British colonial

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<sup>19</sup>Sen, *Poverty and Famines*, 5.

<sup>20</sup>de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 4.

<sup>21</sup>Stephen Devereux, *Theories of Famine* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 15.

<sup>22</sup>Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, 25; Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, 7.

administration systematically underdeveloped peasant agriculture in favour of export commodity production, creating a pattern of rural underdevelopment that persisted after independence. The post-colonial state inherited these institutional structures and, in many respects, intensified them, as political elites redirected the oil revenues of the 1970s boom into patronage networks rather than productive agricultural investment.<sup>23</sup>

Dutch Disease dynamics, including currency appreciation that undermined agricultural competitiveness and the drawing of labour into the oil sector, contributed to a long-term decline in agricultural productivity per capita. By the time global oil prices began their cyclical fluctuations in the 1980s and again in 2014–2016, Nigeria’s agricultural sector was insufficiently developed to cushion the economic shocks, leaving millions of citizens acutely vulnerable to food price volatility.<sup>24</sup>

## **ii. Governance Failure, Corruption, and Institutional Weakness**

The persistence of hunger in Nigeria cannot be understood without reference to the chronic failures of governance that have undermined successive poverty reduction and agricultural development initiatives. Public funds allocated for agricultural development, social protection programs, and rural infrastructure have routinely been diverted through procurement fraud, inflated contracts, and outright embezzlement. The Anchor Borrowers Programme, launched in 2015 to provide smallholder farmers with inputs and credit, was undermined in numerous states by the diversion of funds and the capture of benefits by politically connected actors rather than genuine smallholders. Post-harvest losses, estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent of total

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<sup>23</sup>Falola and Heaton, *A History of Nigeria*, 210.

<sup>24</sup>Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 39.

production in some commodity chains, reflect the absence of adequate storage, processing, and transportation infrastructure.

### **Conflict, Insecurity, and Agricultural Disruption**

Armed conflict has emerged as one of the most potent drivers of food insecurity in Nigeria during the period under review. Thurston's detailed account of the Boko Haram insurgency's origins emphasises the role of socio-economic marginalisation - chronic poverty, educational exclusion, and youth unemployment - in creating the grievance landscape that the movement exploited to build its initial base of support.<sup>25</sup> The insurgency displaced over two million people from the agriculturally productive Lake Chad Basin, destroying farmland and irrigation infrastructure, and severing market linkages that had sustained rural livelihoods for generations.

The farmer–herder conflict in the Middle Belt represents a second major axis of agricultural disruption. The International Crisis Group documented how these conflicts have killed thousands and displaced farming communities across Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Taraba states, resulting in significant reductions in food production in one of Nigeria's most agriculturally important regions.<sup>26</sup>

The nexus between insecurity and hunger operates through multiple channels. Direct violence destroys crops, livestock, and agricultural infrastructure. Displacement removes farmers from their land during critical planting and harvesting seasons. Market disruptions caused by insecurity raise food prices and reduce the purchasing power of affected populations. The diversion of government resources toward security expenditure reduces funds available for agricultural

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<sup>25</sup>Thurston, Boko Haram, 73.

<sup>26</sup>International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer–Herder Violence, 8–12.

investment and social protection, creating a vicious cycle in which poverty and insecurity mutually reinforce each other.

### **Electoral Politics and the Weaponisation of Poverty**

Beyond insurgent violence and structural economic failures, hunger and poverty have been systematically instrumentalised within Nigeria's electoral process. During election cycles, Nigerian politicians have routinely distributed food items - rice, cooking oil, noodles - alongside small cash payments to voters, particularly in rural and economically marginalised communities. The dependence created by poverty reduces the capacity of citizens to evaluate politicians based on policy performance or governance record, converting electoral choice into a survival calculation premised on immediate material needs.<sup>27</sup>

The political logic of maintaining economic dependency is straightforward: in contexts where state patronage is the primary mechanism of resource distribution, political actors who control state access have strong incentives to prevent the emergence of independent economic capacity among their constituencies. Agricultural development programs, if effectively implemented, would reduce the dependency that makes patronage-based political mobilisation effective. This creates a perverse incentive structure in which the short-term electoral interests of political elites may conflict with the long-term developmental interests of the population.

The politicisation of humanitarian assistance is another manifestation of this dynamic. Reports from northeastern Nigeria document instances in which food aid and relief materials

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<sup>27</sup>Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 38.

designated for internally displaced persons were diverted by local officials or distributed along partisan lines, restricting access for communities perceived as politically hostile.<sup>28</sup>

### **Comparative Perspectives: The Politics of Hunger in Africa**

Nigeria's experience of politically instrumentalised food insecurity is not unique within the African context. In Zimbabwe, scholars extensively documented how the ruling ZANU-PF government distributed food aid and agricultural inputs along partisan lines during the political crisis of the early 2000s, systematically denying access to communities supportive of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change. Access to grain and agricultural subsidies became contingent on political loyalty, reinforcing ruling party dominance in rural areas and deepening the food insecurity of non-compliant communities.<sup>29</sup>

The Ethiopian famine of the 1980s offers a further illustration. While the famine's immediate causes included drought and agricultural failure, its severity was significantly worsened by the Derg regime's counter-insurgency policies, which included the forced resettlement of populations from insurgent-held areas, the restriction of food aid access to opposition regions, and the diversion of humanitarian resources.<sup>30</sup>

These comparative cases reinforce a central theoretical argument: hunger is rarely caused solely by natural disaster or agricultural shortfall. Its persistence, distribution, and lethality are shaped by political institutions, governance practices, and the decisions of elites who control

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<sup>28</sup>Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46.

<sup>29</sup>Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 50–60.

<sup>30</sup>de Waal, *Famine Crimes*, 62.

access to resources. Nigeria's experience reflects these same structural dynamics, operating within the particular institutional context of a post-colonial petro-state characterised by high inequality, weak institutions, and competitive patronage politics.

### **Security Implications of Weaponised Hunger and Poverty**

The security implications of Nigeria's food insecurity crisis are multidimensional. At the most fundamental level, extreme deprivation creates the conditions of desperation that make individuals susceptible to recruitment into armed groups, criminal networks, and militant organisations. Thurston's analysis of Boko Haram's recruitment patterns documents how the movement exploited the grievances of young men facing chronic poverty and exclusion from educational and economic opportunity, offering material incentives, community belonging, and a framework of meaning that formal state institutions had failed to provide.<sup>31</sup>

At the community and regional level, food insecurity and poverty have intensified competition over scarce resources, contributing to the escalation of farmer-herder conflicts, communal violence, and land disputes. The Middle Belt has experienced this dynamic acutely, with localised conflicts escalating into broader patterns of sectarian and ethnic violence that have claimed thousands of lives and displaced millions of people.<sup>32</sup> At the national level, the persistence of hunger and poverty erodes the social contract, weakening the foundations of political legitimacy and creating opportunities for external actors - including regional terrorist networks and international criminal organisations - to exploit Nigeria's internal vulnerabilities.

### **Policy Recommendations**

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<sup>31</sup>Thurston, Boko Haram, 45.

<sup>32</sup>International Crisis Group, Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence, 12-14.

Agricultural revitalisation must be the centrepiece of any serious food security strategy. Nigeria's agricultural sector requires transformative investment in mechanised farming, irrigation infrastructure, improved seed varieties, agricultural extension services, and rural road networks that connect smallholder farmers to markets. The post-harvest loss problem, estimated at between 30 and 40 per cent of total production in some commodity chains, demands urgent investment in storage and processing facilities.<sup>33</sup>

Governance reform and anti-corruption enforcement are prerequisites for ensuring that agricultural investments and social protection programs reach their intended beneficiaries. Strengthening the independence and operational capacity of anti-corruption agencies, improving public financial management systems, and empowering civil society and legislative oversight bodies to monitor government spending are all essential components of this effort.

Nigeria's social protection system requires significant expansion to provide meaningful safety nets for the most economically vulnerable citizens. Conditional cash transfer programs, school feeding initiatives, and targeted food assistance programs can reduce the immediate impact of poverty and food insecurity while building human capital. Critically, these programs must be insulated from political manipulation through independent administration, transparent beneficiary selection, and robust monitoring mechanisms.

Electoral reform is essential for dismantling the political structures that perpetuate economic dependency, but its effectiveness depends on clearly defined institutional responsibilities and enforcement mechanisms. Strengthening the enforcement capacity of the Independent National Electoral Commission must be complemented by enhanced inter-agency

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<sup>33</sup>Food and Agriculture Organisation, *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023*, 18–20.

collaboration with the Nigeria Police Force and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, particularly in the investigation and prosecution of electoral offences such as vote-buying and illicit campaign financing. The criminalisation of vote-buying will only serve as an effective deterrent if supported by a proactive prosecutorial framework led by the Ministry of Justice and reinforced through judicial independence and efficiency. Furthermore, reforms to campaign finance laws require not only statutory revision but also rigorous monitoring, transparent reporting systems, and legislative oversight by the National Assembly to ensure compliance and sanction violations.

In parallel, restoring agricultural security in conflict-affected regions necessitates a multi-layered governance approach. Rural policing must be strengthened through the coordinated efforts of the Nigeria Police Force and complementary security agencies, while also integrating community-based vigilante structures within a regulated framework. Sustainable conflict mitigation, particularly in addressing farmer–herder tensions, depends on the institutionalisation of community-based conflict resolution mechanisms involving traditional authorities, local government councils, and civil society organisations. These efforts must be reinforced by targeted economic development programmes implemented through federal and state ministries, aimed at addressing structural drivers such as land scarcity, unemployment, and resource competition. Ultimately, the success of these interventions hinges on a system of accountability in which state institutions, civil society, and the media collectively function to monitor performance, enforce compliance, and constrain abuse.

A critical but often underemphasised dimension of reform lies in the activation of the social contract through civil society engagement. In contexts where hunger and poverty are weaponised as instruments of political control, civil society organisations serve as essential intermediaries

between the state and citizens, capable of reconstituting accountability from the bottom up. Through voter education, rights-based advocacy, and independent monitoring of both electoral processes and public resource distribution, civil society actors can compel the state to fulfil its obligations while simultaneously empowering citizens to assert their political and economic rights. This function is particularly significant in environments where formal institutions such as the Independent National Electoral Commission and the Nigeria Police Force may be constrained by political interference or limited capacity.

Furthermore, the activation of the social contract requires sustained civic mobilisation aimed at delegitimising practices such as vote-buying and the politicisation of food insecurity. Civil society organisations, in collaboration with the media and grassroots networks, play a pivotal role in reshaping public norms, exposing abuses of power, and demanding transparency in governance. At the community level, they also facilitate participatory dialogue and conflict mediation, particularly in regions affected by farmer–herder violence, thereby reinforcing both social cohesion and state accountability. Ultimately, by bridging the gap between citizens and the state, civil society transforms passive populations into active stakeholders, thereby undermining the structural conditions that enable the weaponisation of poverty and hunger.

## **Conclusion**

The weaponisation of hunger and poverty represents one of the most profound threats to Nigeria’s national stability in the twenty-first century. Between 2015 and 2023, a convergence of economic recession, governance failure, armed conflict, and global disruptions transformed food insecurity from a chronic development challenge into an acute national security crisis. While hunger in Nigeria is not typically the product of deliberate state policy, structural governance

failures, institutional corruption, and political patronage systems have created conditions in which deprivation persists, reproduces itself, and is actively exploited by political and armed actors.<sup>34</sup>

Analysed through the lens of Social Contract Theory, this situation represents a fundamental breach of the implicit agreement between the Nigerian state and its citizens. The state's failure to guarantee access to food and economic security has eroded its legitimacy, fuelled insurgent recruitment, deepened electoral dysfunction, and created conditions of systemic vulnerability. The comparative evidence from Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and other African contexts confirms that this dynamic is not unique to Nigeria but reflects structural patterns associated with weak institutions, resource dependence, and post-colonial governance deficits.

Addressing this crisis demands a comprehensive national strategy that integrates agricultural revitalisation, governance reform, social protection expansion, electoral accountability, and rural security restoration. These reforms are not merely developmental imperatives; they are security necessities. Without dismantling the structural conditions that sustain hunger and poverty, Nigeria will continue to face the profound security challenges that flow from a broken social contract.

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<sup>34</sup>Abiodun Olusola Omotayo et al., "Rising Food Prices and Farming Households' Food Insecurity during the COVID-19 Pandemic," *Agriculture* 12, no. 3 (2022): 2–4.

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